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DLD-125 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 




MANUEL ROBERT ANDERSON LEMAR; THE 
ESTATE OF ROBERT BRICE ANDERSON;  THE 
ESTATE OF ELLA ELIZABETH ANDERSON LEMAR,
 Appellants
v. 
AMERICAN TRADING CORPORATIONS; HARRIET  
EMILY CHASE ANDERSON; AMOCO OIL CO.  
n/k/a BP PRODUCTS NORTH AMERICA, INC.;  
AMERICAN TRADING AND PRODUCTION  
CORPORATION; AMOCO OIL/BP PRODUCTS NORTH  
AMERICA INC.; HARRIETT EMILY CHASE AND SEGAR 
 __________________________________  
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 2-14-cv-04717) 
District Judge: C. Darnell Jones, II
__________________________________ 
Submitted on a Motion to Dismiss and/or Summarily Affirm 
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
January 28, 2016 
Before:  CHAGARES, GREENAWAY, JR. and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges 







 Appellant Manuel Robert Anderson Lemar appeals from an order of the District 
Court dismissing his second amended complaint with prejudice.  For the reasons that 
follow, we will summarily affirm, with one modification. 
 Lemar filed suit initially in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas on 
behalf of himself and the Estates of Robert Brice Anderson and Ella Elizabeth Anderson 
Lemar, naming as defendants the American Trading and Production Corporation 
(“American Trading”), BP Corporation of North America, Inc. (“BP”), and his aunt, 
Harriet Emily Chase Anderson Seger (“Ms. Anderson”), and alleging a violation of the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961, et 
seq.  In the main, Lemar alleged that American Trading and BP engaged in a conspiracy 
involving “illegal land tax seizures” to defraud his grandfather’s estate of an ownership 
interest in an Amoco refinery.  The fraud took place in 1955, 1956 and 1957, and 
allegedly deprived his mother, Ella Lemar Anderson, who was only 12 years-old at the 
time, of her rightful inheritance.  Ms. Anderson was alleged to be wrongfully in 
possession of some of Ella’s inheritance.  Lemar asserted that “[i]f my mother was white 
this never would have happened to her.”  Complaint, at ¶ 24.  Lemar sought billions of 
dollars in money damages.    
 American Trading paid the filing fee and removed the case to federal court based 
on both the federal RICO question, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and diversity of citizenship, 28 
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U.S.C. § 1332.1  American Trading and BP then moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant 
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that it was time-barred under 
RICO’s four-year statute of limitation; that the allegations in the complaint were 
conclusory and implausible; and that Lemar lacked standing to pursue a RICO claim on 
behalf of his grandfather’s and mother’s estates.  Ms. Anderson, who was not served with 
the complaint, did not respond.  Lemar opposed the motions, arguing that his RICO claim 
was not time-barred because the RICO violation was a continuing one.  The District 
Court granted the defendants’ motions on the ground that the complaint did not satisfy 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) (“A pleading that states a claim for relief must 
contain: *** a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled 
to relief.”).  The Court permitted Lemar to submit an amendment that would cure the 
deficiencies in his complaint. 
 Lemar then filed an amended complaint, in which he essentially reiterated his 
original allegations but, instead of asserting a RICO claim, he asserted new state law 
counts of fraud, breach of fiduciary duty to his grandfather’s estate, and conversion 
against the defendants.  Lemar alleged in his amended complaint that his grandfather 
owned Amoco’s only fuel storage refinery on the east coast.  He contended that his 
grandfather, who was half-black, and his white great-grandfather, John Teen Anderson, 
                                              
1 American Trading asserted that Ms. Anderson was improperly joined as a defendant 
solely for the purpose of defeating diversity jurisdiction, and that her Pennsylvania 
citizenship was thus not relevant to the determination of jurisdiction.  We note that Lemar 
did not seek a remand to state court; rather, he filed a response to removal in which he 
agreed that his RICO claim belonged in federal court.  He further disagreed that his aunt 
was not a proper party to the lawsuit but he noted that he had not been successful in 
serving her with the complaint.  See Docket Entry No. 10. 
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were “some of the wealthiest men on the east coast.”  He contended that American 
Trading, along with Amoco Oil, were business partners with the Andersons for two 
generations.  But, American Trading and Amoco, upon his grandfather’s death, failed to 
report his grandfather’s assets to the estate.  He alleged that these defendants fraudulently 
kept assets from his grandfather’s estate and kept everything for themselves.  As a result 
of his mother’s having been deprived of her inheritance, he and his 9 siblings grew up in 
extreme poverty.  Lemar alleged that American Trading never told him or his mother 
about his grandfather’s wealth, and he only uncovered the fraud in February of 2013, and 
April of 2014.  Again, Lemar alleged that Ms. Anderson was wrongfully in possession of 
his mother’s inheritance.  After the filing of this amended complaint, Lemar made several 
improper and unsuccessful attempts to serve Ms. Anderson, apparently by mailing the 
amended complaint to her.  See Pa. R. Civ. P. 402(a); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e).  Each time it 
was returned as undeliverable. 
 American Trading and BP moved to dismiss the amended complaint, asserting that 
the applicable statutes of limitation for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty and conversion 
were even shorter than the RICO statute of limitation, and that the allegations in the 
amended complaint were insufficient to make out a plausible claim for either fraud, 
breach of fiduciary duty or conversion.  In response, the District Court gave Lemar one 
final chance to amend his complaint.  Lemar filed a second amended complaint, see 
Docket Entry No. 105, which did not differ in any significant respect from his first 
amended complaint.  American Trading and BP moved to dismiss it, and, in an order 
entered on April 21, 2015, the District Court dismissed Lemar’s civil action with 
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prejudice as to all three defendants, concluding that he had failed to state a claim upon 
which relief may be granted, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  The Court later denied Lemar’s 
motion for reconsideration and request to file another amended complaint. 
 Lemar appeals.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our Clerk advised 
him that, as a pro se litigant, he could represent himself but not the Estates of Robert 
Brice Anderson and Ella Elizabeth Anderson Lemar, and that those parties would be 
dismissed unless an attorney entered an appearance on their behalf, which did not 
happen.  These parties are deemed dismissed from the appeal.  The District Court granted 
Lemar leave to appeal in forma pauperis.  Lemar has submitted a motion for appointment 
of counsel.  American Trading has moved to dismiss the appeal and/or for summary 
affirmance.  
  We will grant American Trading’s motion and summarily affirm the order of the 
District Court as to all of the defendants/appellees because no substantial question is 
presented by this appeal, Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.  We exercise plenary 
review over a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, see Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 425 
(3d Cir. 2001).  Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper where the complaint fails to state 
a claim upon which relief may be granted, such as where the plaintiff is unable to plead 
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).  The plausibility standard “asks for more than a 
sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 
678 (2009).  Conclusory allegations are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.  See 
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009).  Lemar’s sweeping 
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allegations of a conspiracy by American Trading and BP to steal his mother’s and thus 
his inheritance are conclusory and cannot support his claims for fraud, breach of fiduciary 
duty and conversion, just as the District Court concluded. 
 Even if Lemar’s allegations were somehow adequate to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2), and 
they are not, his claims are plainly time-barred.2  The applicable statute of limitation is 
two years for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty and conversion, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann § 
5524(3), (7).  All of Lemar’s claims relate to conduct that took place nearly 60 years ago.  
Lemar specifically alleged that one or more of the defendants did not disclose his 
grandfather’s assets to the estate administrator when his grandfather passed away in 
1955, and that his family (through his grandfather’s estate) was deprived of his 
grandfather’s assets at that time.  Moreover, although Lemar contends that he only 
recently learned about the claims, nothing in his amended complaint shows or suggests 
that the information that forms the basis of his claims – the death certificate and public 
tax records he cites in his amended complaint – was not readily available and 
discoverable had he exercised diligence in pursuing his claims.  See Pocono Int’l 
Raceway, Inc. v. Pocono Produce, Inc., 468 A.2d 468, 471 (Pa. 1983) (holding that 
statute of limitation begins to run as soon as right to institute and maintain suit arises, and 
that lack of knowledge, mistake or misunderstanding do not toll running of statute).  See 
also Ingenito v. AC & S, Inc., 633 A.2d 1172, 1175 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (“The polestar 
of the Pennsylvania discovery rule is not a plaintiff’s actual acquisition of knowledge but 
                                              
2 A defendant may raise the statute of limitation defense in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion if the 
complaint shows plainly that the cause of action is time-barred.  See Bethel v. Jendoco 
Construction Corp., 570 F.2d 1168, 1174 (3d Cir. 1978). 
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whether the information, through the exercise of due diligence, was knowable to the 
plaintiff.”). 
 The decision of the District Court is summarily affirmed as to Ms. Anderson for 
failure of service, Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) (if defendant is not served within 90 days after the 
complaint is filed, the court -- on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff -- must 
dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant.”). 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will grant American Trading’s motion and 
summarily affirm the order of the District Court as to all of the defendants/appellees, with 
the modification as to Ms. Anderson noted.  Appellant’s motion for appointment of 
counsel is denied as moot. 
 
